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Abstract - Security is a critical problem when 
implementing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) 
and is widely acknowledged. This paper describes the 
effects of selfish nodes in MANETs. An Ad Hoc 
Network is a collection of wireless mobile hosts 
forming a temporary network without the aid of any 
centralized administration or standard support 
services. One of the different kinds of misbehavior is 
node selfishness. A selfish node wants to preserve its 
own resources while using the services of others and 
consuming their resources, such misbehaving nodes 
participate in the route discovery and maintenance 
phase but refuse to forward data packets, which 
degrades routing performance. One way of preventing 
selfishness in MANETs is the detection and exclusion 
mechanism. In this paper, we focus on authenticated 
scheme, which preserves communication privacy and 
mitigates selfish nodes in MANETs. The simulation 
results are presented here that shows the negative 
effects which selfish nodes causes in MANETs. 
Index Terms: Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
(MANETs), selfish nodes, routing, network 
security, Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     Mobile  Ad  Hoc  Network  (MANET)  is  an 
autonomous collection of mobile users that 
communicate over relatively bandwidth constrained 
wireless links. Since the nodes are mobile, the 
network topology may change rapidly and 
unpredictably over time. The network is 
decentralized, where all network activity including 
discovering the topology and delivering messages 
must be executed by the nodes itself, i.e., routing 
functionality will be incorporated into mobile nodes. 
     Ad  hoc  environments  introduce  two  main 
problems not commonly faced by traditionally fixed 
network routing protocols.  The problems occur due 
to the lack of fixed infrastructure support and the 
frequent changes in network topology.  MANETs 
support dynamic communication environments and 
facilitate large-scale, real-time data processing in 
complex environments.  Ad hoc networks require no 
fixed infrastructure, such as a base station or access 
points.  Networks can be established inexpensively, as 
needed. 
     There exist two types of MANETs namely open and 
closed [1]. Closed MANETs do not have cooperation 
problems, since all nodes work towards a common goal 
and can easily be controlled.  Open MANETs contain 
nodes that share their resources to ensure global 
connectivity but they may have different goals.  The 
nodes in open MANETs are operated by multiple users, 
and therefore they need not be forced to cooperate. 
     Selfish Nodes [2][3][12]: Each node relies on the 
routing information it receives from other nodes in 
order to determine appropriate routes. Open 
environment of MANET may lead to selfish nodes 
(misbehaving nodes).  These selfish nodes use the 
services provided by the network, but they do not 
contribute to the network.  Such nodes have a negative 
impact on the overall performance of the network. The 
selfish nodes spend their energy only for their own 
needs, such as sending packets to destination, but they 
do not forward packets from other nodes, because they 
see this process as wasted energy.  If the selfish node 
drops all the packets, then the routing algorithm will 
eventually find another route around this node. If the 
selfish node drops only a certain percentage of packets, 
the other nodes get an impression that it is not done 
intentionally but only due to the interferences. 
     We propose the authenticated approach to prevent 
and mitigate the negative effects of selfish nodes.  The 
basic idea is, when a node forwards a data packet over 
the next hop, the destination node of the next hop will 
send back an authenticated acknowledgement packet to 
indicate that the data packet has been received. 
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
Section II, we summarize the various schemes that 
have been proposed and studied in the literature to 
prevent selfish nodes.  In Section III, we describe the 
details of proposed AAS scheme.  Section IV presents 
the performance analysis and simulation results. 
Finally in Section V, we conclude the paper and 
discuss the plan for future work.  
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II. RELATED WORKS 
A. Incentive-Based Schemes 
     Some algorithms employ credit based schemes to 
discourage selfish nodes. These scheme works on 
the principle that you get credit for every packet you 
forward, and pay some of the credit to send a 
message yourself.  We need to take into account the 
malicious nature of non-cooperative nodes, which 
may tamper with their own credit count.  To avoid 
this, special hardware would be needed for keeping 
track of the credit. 
     In Sprite [4], a credit based scheme proposed by 
Zhong, each node maintains receipts for messages 
which are received and forwarded.  When the nodes 
get a connection to a credit clearance service, they 
report those credits, and based on the decision taken 
by the CCS the nodes need to pay or they may be 
rewarded with real money.  Since this uses an 
external party for the payment, it may not be useful 
for all scenarios. 
     In [3], Buttyan and Hubaux, used the concept of 
beans (nuggets) as payments for packet forwarding.  
They proposed two models: packet purse model and 
packet trade model.  In packet purse model, beans 
are loaded into the packet before it is sent.  The 
sender puts a certain number of beans on the data 
packet to be sent.  Each intermediate node earns 
beans in return for forwarding the packet.  If the 
packet exhausts, the beans in it drops before 
reaching its destination.  In the packet trade model, 
each intermediate node buys the packet from the 
previous node for some nuggets. Thus, each 
intermediate node earns some beans for providing 
the forwarding service and the overall cost of 
sending the packet is borne by the destination. 
B. Reputation-based schemes 
     This  is  an  approach designed to encourage 
cooperation based on reputation.  In this scheme, the 
nodes that detect misbehavior inform the other 
nodes in order to exclude the suspicious node from 
the network.  This can be problematic, as nodes may 
have to choose a route passing the malicious node in 
order to inform the cooperative nodes. The 
uncooperative node could simply drop this message.   
    Marti et al.[2] proposed a scheme, which contains 
two modules: watchdog and pathrater. The 
watchdog module overhears the medium to check 
whether the next-hop node faithfully forwards the 
packet or not. At the same time, it maintains a 
buffer of recently sent packets. A data packet is 
cleared from the buffer when the watchdog 
overhears the same packet being forwarded by the 
next hop node over the medium. If a data packet 
remains too long in the buffer, the watchdog module 
accuses the next-hop neighbor to be misbehaving. 
Thus, the watchdog enables misbehavior detection 
at the forwarding level as well as the link level. 
Based on watchdog’s accusations, the pathrater rates 
every path in its cache and subsequently chooses the 
path that best avoids misbehaving nodes. However, the 
watchdog technique may fail to detect misbehavior in 
the presence of ambiguous collisions, receiver 
collisions, limited transmission power, false 
misbehavior and partial dropping. 
     The CONFIDANT protocol proposed by Buchegger 
et al.[5] consists of four important components: the 
Monitor, the Reputation System, the Path Manager, 
and the Trust Manager. They perform the vital 
functions of neighborhood watching, node rating, path 
rating, and sending and receiving alarm messages, 
respectively. Each node continuously monitors the 
behavior of its first-hop neighbors. If a suspicious 
event is detected, details of the event are passed to the 
Reputation System. Depending on how significant and 
how frequent the event is, the Reputation System 
modifies the rating of the suspected node. Once the 
rating of a node becomes intolerable, control is passed 
to the Path Manager, which accordingly controls the 
route cache. Warning messages are propagated to other 
nodes in the form of an Alarm message sent out by the 
Trust Manager.  
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A. Selfish Node Model 
          We present the selfish node model considered in 
this paper in the context of the DSR protocol [7].  
     We focus on the following routing misbehavior: A 
selfish node does not perform the packet forwarding 
function for data packets which are unrelated to them. 
However, it operates normally in the route discovery 
and the route maintenance phases of the DSR protocol. 
Since such misbehaving nodes participate in the route 
discovery phase, they may be included in the routes 
chosen to forward the data packets from the source. 
The selfish nodes, however, refuses to forward the data 
packets from the source and thus leads to confusion. 
     In guaranteed services such as TCP, the source node 
may either choose an alternate route from its route 
cache or initiate a new route discovery process. The 
alternate route may again contain selfish nodes and, 
therefore, the data transmission may fail again. The 
new route discovery phase will return a similar set of 
routes, including the selfish nodes. Eventually, the 
source node may conclude that routes are unavailable 
to deliver the data packets. As a result, the network 
fails to provide reliable communication for the source 
node even though such routes are available. In best-
effort services such as UDP, the source simply sends 
out data packets to the next-hop node, which forwards 
them on. The existence of selfish nodes on the route 
will cut off the data traffic flow. The source has no 
knowledge of this at all.  
     In  this  paper,  we  propose  the  Authenticated 
Acknowledgement Scheme (AAS) to detect such 
selfish nodes. Routes containing such nodes will be 
eliminated from consideration. The source node will be 
able to choose an appropriate route to send its data. 
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B. The TWOACK Scheme 
     In the TWOACK scheme [6], TWOACK packets 
are sent for every data packet received. 
Acknowledging the received data packets gives the 
AAS scheme better performance with respect to 
routing overhead. The AAS scheme has an 
authentication mechanism to make sure that the 
acknowledgement  packets are genuine.  The 
TWOACK scheme provides no authentication for 
the acknowledgement packets which has been sent 
form the receiver but the proposed scheme provides 
an authentication mechanism which improves the 
performance of the network and cost as compared to 
the TWOACK.  
C. AAS Scheme 
     The AAS scheme is a network-layer technique to 
detect the selfish nodes and to mitigate their effects. 
It can be implemented as an add-on to existing 
routing protocols for MANETs, such as DSR. The 
AAS scheme detects misbehavior through the use of 
a new type of authenticated acknowledgment 
scheme termed AAS, which assigns a fixed route of 
two hops (three nodes) in the opposite direction of 
the data traffic route. 
 
Fig.1. Direction of Data and Acknowledgement 
          The fig.1 illustrates the operation of the AAS 
scheme. Suppose that N1, N2, and N3 are three 
consecutive nodes (triplet) along a route, the route 
from a source node, S, to a destination node, D, is 
generated in the route discovery phase of the DSR 
protocol. When N1 sends a data packet to N2 and N2 
forwards it to N3, it is unclear to N1 whether N3 
receives the data packet successfully or not. Such an 
ambiguity exists even when there are no 
misbehaving nodes. The problem becomes much 
more severe in open MANETs with potential selfish 
nodes. 
     The  AAS  scheme  requires  an  explicit 
acknowledgment to be sent by N3 to notify N1 of its 
successful reception of data packets. When node N3 
receives the data packets successfully, it sends out a 
acknowledgement packet over two hops to N1 (i.e., 
the opposite direction of the routing path as shown 
in Fig.1), with the ID of the corresponding data 
packets. The triplet [N1-> N2-> N3] is derived from 
the route of the original data traffic. Such a triplet is 
used by N1 to monitor the link N2->N3. For 
convenience of presentation, we term N1 in the 
triplet [N1-> N2-> N3] the acknowledgement packet 
receiver and N3 the acknowledgement packet sender. 
D. Packet Authentication 
     Since the acknowledgement packets are forwarded 
by intermediate node without proper protection, a 
selfish node N2 can simply fabricate the 
acknowledgement packets and claim that they were 
sent by node N3.  Therefore, an authentication 
technique is needed in order to protect the 
acknowledgement packets from being forged. 
     When a node wishes to communicate with another 
node, a methodology is performed by the sending and 
receiving nodes, which ensures authentication and 
integrity. For complete confidentiality, a method 
authenticates packets that are transmitted serially in a 
network. A current password is selected for a current 
packet to be transmitted. The current packet includes 
current data.  A one-way/one-time [13] [14] hash 
function is applied to the current password to form a 
current tag.  A next password is selected for a next 
packet that includes next data, and the one-way/one-
time hash function is applied to the next data, the next 
tag, and the current password to obtain a hashed value.  
The current packet is then transmitted to include the 
hash value, the current data, the current tag, and a 
previous password of a previous transmitted packet to 
authenticate the current data. 
E. Algorithm of the AAS Scheme 
     The triplet N1-> N2-> N3 in Fig.1 has been used to 
illustrate algorithm and this algorithm run on each of 
the sender and receiver of the acknowledgement packet. 
Acknowledgement Packet Sender (Node N3) 
Step1: Send authenticated acknowledgement packet  
           from N3 to node N1 
Step2: Initialize the counter of forwarded data packets  
           and acknowledgement packets. 
Step3: If the data packet is received then 
Step4: Increase the counter of the received packets 
    at node N3 
Step5: If the data packet needs to be acknowledged 
Step6: Prepare Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
Step7: Prepare acknowledgement packet with ID  
           and MAC 
Step8: Send the acknowledgement packet 
Step9: Increase the counter of acknowledgement  
           packet at node N3 
Step10: Repeat steps from 3 to 9 for all the data  
             packets 
 
Acknowledgement Packet Receiver (Node N1) 
 
Process 1 (receiving authenticated element) 
 
Step1: If the authenticated element received by N1  
           from acknowledgement packet sender N3  
                then 
Step2: Record the authenticated element received  
           from N3 
 
 
S  D  N1 
N3  N2 
 Acknowledgement: N3 – N2 – N1 
               Data Direction 
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      Process 2 (receiving acknowledgement packets) 
 
Step3: Start the observation at randomly selected  
           time 
Step4: Initialize the LIST (data structure for holds  
           the data IDs), counter of forwarded  
           data packets, and the counter of missing  
           acknowledgement packets to zero 
           (maintained at the receiving node N1) 
Step5: If the data packet is forwarded then 
           Add the data ID to the LIST, Increase the  
           counter of the forwarded packets, and  
           record the timer 
Step6: If the acknowledgement packet is received  
           then check the availability of the data ID for  
           the acknowledgement packet received and  
           check the validity of authenticated element 
Step7: Remove the ID from the LIST and  
           clear the timer 
Step8: If the data ID of the acknowledgement  
           packet is not received then remove the ID   
           from the LIST and increase the   
           misbehavior counter 
Step9: If  the observation period expires send  
           misbehavior report 
Step10: Repeat the entire steps for all the packets 
 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Simulation Methodology 
     In this section, we present the evaluation of the 
AAS scheme through the network simulator (ns-2) 
[15]. We have modified the DSR protocol in ns-2 to 
simulate the selfish nodes described in Section I. 
     For  the  communication  pattern,  we  implement 
CBR transmissions between pairs of nodes.  The 
source and destination for each pair are randomly 
chosen such that there is no limit on the number of 
sources or destinations that a node can host.  The 
AAS scheme is analyzed under varying traffic 
conditions by running simulations for networks.   
We measure the following evaluation metrics for 
different percentage of selfish nodes in the network.  
Packet Delivery Ratio: defined as the ratio of the 
number of packets received at the destination node 
to the number of packets sent by the source node.  
Routing Overhead: defined as the ratio of the 
amount of routing-related transmissions in bytes to 
the amount of data transmissions in bytes in a 
network. 
B. Simulation Environment 
          The network simulator (ns-2) helps us to 
evaluate the communication aspects of our method, 
such as route discovery and average route load in ad 
hoc wireless network. Simulation with the following 
parameters has been done to study the effects of the 
node selfishness, monitoring technique and 
proposed approach on the performance of 
MANETs. 
TABLE: 1  
SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
Parameter Value 
Node distribution  [700 x 700], [1000 x1000] 
Node Mobility [0, 10], [10, 20] m/s 
Data rate (traffic)  2 x 4kb 
Pause Time 10 sec, 60 sec 
Simulation time 180s 
 Nodes Tested on 40, 60 nodes
Misbehaving nodes 10, 20, 30 
 
Scalability: We examine the scalability of the system 
in terms of number of nodes, fraction of misbehaving 
nodes, mobility, and distribution area. We have chosen 
different values like 0- 40 number of nodes, 0 to 40% 
of misbehaving nodes, mobility from 0m/s to 20m/s 
and for distribution area from 700 sq meters to 1000 sq 
meters.  
Availability: We change the different parameters to see 
whether the design provides security service to mobile 
hosts.  
Robustness: There are some provisions in the proposed 
design to ensure robustness of the system against 
wrong observations and wrong accusations, i.e., 
maliciously excluding cooperative nodes by spreading 
the rumor that they misbehave. 
C. Simulation Results 
     In this section we analyze the results obtained from 
simulation experiments carried out in ns-2 to study the 
impact of selfish nodes on the network and to evaluate 
the network with different approaches under different 
conditions. 
 
Fig. 2 Packet Delivery Ratio of AAS and DSR 
     Fig.2  shows  the  comparison  of  network 
performance in terms of network throughput when we 
use different mobility of the mobile nodes in the 
presence of selfish nodes. Initially nodes are uniformly 
distributed and node mobility are emulated according 
to the random way point model. We run simulations 
with the assumption of selfish nodes as 0, 10, 20, and 
30 with pause time to 10ms with random source and 
destination pairs through the simulations. And also 
compares the packet delivery ratio of the original DSR 
scheme, and the proposed AAS scheme. The 
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percentage of selfish nodes in the network varied 
from 0 to 40%.  The packet delivery ratio decreases 
as more as nodes in the network are selfish.  This is 
due to the problem of missing routes and the 
overhead of searching for alternative routes.  When 
compared with the original DSR scheme, the 
proposed AAS scheme maintains a relatively high 
packet delivery ratio (Throughput). 
 
Fig. 3 Routing Overhead of AAS and  DSR 
     Fig.3  indicates  that  the  overhead  transmission 
increases if we increase the pause time from 10sec 
to 60sec. And for mobility if we increase the speed 
of nodes movement, overhead transmission 
decreases.  
 
Fig. 4 Routing Overhead of AAS, TWOACK, and DSR 
          Fig. 4 compares the routing overhead of the 
AAS, TWOACK and DSR schemes for different 
percentages of selfish nodes.  It can be observed that 
the routing overhead of the AAS is relatively higher 
than the TWOACK scheme and the original DSR 
scheme.  This is due to the increase of data traffic 
being delivered successfully in the AAS scheme.    
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
     In this paper we have described the possible 
extension to DSR protocol for preventing the effects 
of selfish nodes in MANETs.  The scheme provides 
a solution to security support in MANETs and 
mitigates the selfish nodes. We have also evaluated 
the impact of selfish nodes in the network in terms 
of throughput, routing overhead and end-to-end 
delay. Simulation based analyses of this technique 
show improvement in throughput by detection and 
exclusion of the selfish nodes, but it increases the 
end-to-end delay as well as overhead transmission. 
     Our model motivates mainly the service availability 
in each network environment and this is crucial in 
supporting ubiquitous service for mobile users.  
Future Work 
     The  reputation  value  can  be  calculated  more 
accurately through the accurate estimation procedure. 
Network performance can also be improved using 
dedicated nodes as independent network operators. In 
this paper we have discussed only about excluding the 
selfish nodes to increase the throughput. In future we 
can also identify the weaken links in the network and 
exclude them to improve the network performance 
further. 
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